Invisible Man on Third…

I was wandering around my yard after dinner the other night, half-heartedly taking inventory of the garden chores I had been dodging, when I noticed some kids playing kickball across the street. There were six of them, three per team, and they were pretty good kickers, so they were doing a lot of base running. I chuckled when the tall kid standing on third base yelled "Invisible man on third!," at which point the base runners on first and second and the kids on the other team watched intently while he jogged to home plate to kick. Bases loaded, invisible man on third! I hadn't heard that proclamation for a long time, but if you have ever played kickball, stickball, baseball or softball with teams of three or less, you know all about the invisible man.

For some reason, that kickball game got me thinking about invisibility as a attribute in planning and operations and personal behavior. In certain circumstances, as in the small team base-running scenario, it is an operating imperative as the game can't proceed unless the invisible runner rule is invoked. Invisibility is the goal of many corporate security protocols, to protect sensitive information, to preserve privacy and confidentiality, and to shield intellectual property from attack or discovery. It is the intended product of stealth functionality, to camouflage activities while providing cover or anonymity. It can be an element of a individual's operating model, or a preference, as when someone acts behind the scenes or tries to avoid visibility or to otherwise conceal their activities. And sometimes it emerges as an incidental factor in a program or project, usually through negligence or inadvertence, when folks aren't paying attention and ownership, accountability and decision rights don't get clearly established.

My first encounter with a corporate version of the invisible man came decades ago while I was working as a claims supervisor for a large insurer in Massachusetts. I remember the claims supervisor job as a tough one, largely because the supervisor was responsible for monitoring and directing a hefty and constantly shifting portfolio of claims toward timely and appropriate resolution. Theoretically, the supervisor would assign the claims to claims handlers who moved them through the phases--investigation, evaluation and resolution--but sometimes there just weren't enough claim handlers available to handle all the claims. Turnover, training, vacations, hiring freezes, an increasing volume of new claims--any one of these things could create a situation where there were too many claims and not enough claim handlers. The solution? At that particular company the solution was Mr. X, who had a diary number and carried a large caseload of slow moving claims reassigned from other claim handlers. Every claims supervisor had a Mr.X on staff. He was imaginary and invisible, so he wasn't able to accomplish anything on the claims, but the reassignments to Mr.X created workload capacity so the real claim handlers could handle more new claims. Mr.X was an operating imperative.
 
Years later, I bumped into Mr.X's cousins at a third party claims administrator in New Jersey. The TPA had guaranteed their clients that claim workloads would not exceed a certain number per claim handler. As the end of the month approached, if workloads were higher than promised the TPA claims supervisors would reassign claims to themselves or to their office manager to reduce the claim handler workloads to the agreed number. This was done for stealth reasons, to conceal actual workload levels. Of course the supervisors and manager weren't imaginary or invisible, but they may as well have been since they did not actually work on the claims assigned to them. They were simply placeholders until after month end, at which point the claims would be reassigned to the claims handlers.

Radio and TV journalist Richard Harkness is credited with drafting this definition of a committee: "A group of the unwilling, picked from the unfit, to do the unnecessary." While I think that characterization is a bit severe, I have probably been on too many committees, so I believe it is fair to say that most committees have at least one member who fails to attend meetings and contributes little or nothing to the committee's work. That's awkward enough, but when the invisible committee member also happens to be the committee chair, it is even more awkward. I remember working on a committee in New York where the chair would schedule a meeting, then miss the meeting at the last minute because of a vague, recurring malady he described only as "man flu." The committee would meet without him, cover the agenda, provide him with the minutes, then he would schedule another meeting, and at the last minute...well, you have probably lived this dream yourself. He was an absentee committee chair, he took credit for the committee's work, yet he never contributed anything to that work.

I have seen the same type of incidental invisibility in large scale technology development and/or implementation projects, where it is frequently difficult to determine who, if anyone, actually "owns" the project. I always ask two questions: 1) Has any one person actually been tasked with setting direction, managing obstacles and making decisions on the project? 2) Is there a real person who knows and understands he/she will be held responsible and accountable if things don't work out as expected on the project? It is usually easy to identify the project sponsor, and the steering committee, and the subject matter experts, and the IT folks who are managing the project, but the project owner is often not visible. Why? Either project ownership responsibility was never specifically assigned or, more likely, ownership was assigned to a committee. Psychologist Will Schutz was no doubt thinking of something else when he wrote this, but he did a good job of describing the inevitable, unfortunate outcome when an owner-less or committee-owned project fails to meet expectations: "Everyone is responsible but no one is to blame."

It is even worse when the wrong person or department is identified as the owner. I think it is crazy for Human Resources executives to own an employee engagement project, for example, or for IT executives to own a technology development or implementation project. These are business projects, and they should be owned by the business leader who convinced the organization that he/she had a problem or an opportunity, and that the project was the solution. Sure, HR and IT are there to assist, to provide expertise, structure, oversight, and maybe even project management, but the business person owner needs to remain visible, responsible and accountable.

Jonathan Lethem made a point about invisibility in his book Chronic City: "The invisible are always so resolutely invisible, until you see them." That's true in business and in life, I suppose, but no matter how hard you try, you'll never be able to see the invisible man on third.  That's just the way it is.

Dean K. Harring, CPCU, CIC is a retired Chief Claims Officer and an expert and advisor on Property Casualty insurance claims and operations. He can be reached at dean.harring@theclm.org or through LinkedIn or Twitter.

Competence: A Blend of Knowledge, Skill and Will

For most of my years as a Chief Claims Officer, I carried a notebook with me constantly. I used it as a journal, capturing meeting notes, assignments, commitments, requests, details of conversations, lists of people I had to see, and tasks that needed to be accomplished. I also logged ideas or topics or quotes that struck me as interesting or potentially useful. Each weekend I would review my notes, then categorize and prioritize the items into action lists for the coming week, month, quarter and year. A notebook would last me about three months, except in very busy times, and I still have most of those notebooks. This past weekend I was flipping through an old one, and I came across a quote I had written in block letters, attributed to German writer and politician Johann Wolfgang von Goethe:

“Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do.”

Funny how a simple quote in a notebook can provoke vivid memories. I was immediately able to recall the situation I was facing when I scribbled that note. I had been in place as the Chief Claims Officer for a large, troubled insurance company for a little more than a year. One of the premier US management consulting firms had been in residence the entire time, helping to do a baseline loss cost leakage study. It was a very tense situation. Just to be clear, there are some inconsistent definitions out there now, but when I use the term "leakage" I am referring to the amount paid on a claim above and beyond what should have been paid. Leakage is generally reported as a rate, a % of the total amount paid on a claim (or sample of claims), so if $10,000 was paid on a claim that should have been resolved for $9,000, the leakage rate would be the amount overpaid ($1,000) divided by the total paid ($10,000) or 10%. Leakage rates under 5% were considered acceptable back then, but the baseline numbers I was seeing were at least three times that number, across all lines of business, so I knew I had a problem.

While a properly executed baseline leakage review reveals, by line of business, where in the claims handling process leakage is happening, it's the root cause analysis that pinpoints why it is happening. The only good news about leakage is that it is easy to eliminate if you have access to a candid and dependable root cause analysis.

I remember being disappointed with the original root cause analysis because it concluded that training was the remedy for the leakage problem. In other words, claim handlers were making poor loss cost management decisions because they hadn't been trained appropriately--they didn't have the level of knowledge necessary to handle claims properly.

I knew it couldn't be that simple. I had looked at closed files myself and I had seen breakdowns in core claim handling that couldn't be fully explained by lack of knowledge. Best practices were being ignored by claims handlers and their managers, file documentation was substandard, the prevailing claims management focus was passive and tactical (process based) rather than active and strategic (resolution based), and there was an alarming lack of urgency evident in the files. Something else was going on.

We dug a bit deeper, and it didn't take long to conclude that our primary leakage root cause did indeed involve a competence gap, but the gap had three different components: knowledge, skill and will. Think of knowledge as the process of learning and understanding how to do something. Skill involves applying that knowledge in a practical setting to produce desired results. And will, as we considered it, was all about attitude, character, determination, discipline, and the desire and willingness to work to produce the best outcomes. Competence requires all three--knowledge, skill and will. In claim handling, that means the claim handler has to know how to handle claims, be skilled at applying that knowledge, and be willing to diligently work at producing the best results.

While training can close a knowledge gap, and hands-on training, guided practice and mentoring can help improve skills, will is a "hearts and minds" challenge--it involves determination and choice. People decide the degree to which they are willing to apply their knowledge and skills and efforts in any given situation based upon well known motivators. Of course today we tend to talk about employee engagement (the extent to which employees feel passionate about their jobs, are committed to the organization, and put discretionary effort into their work), not will, although the concepts are basically the same.

It turned out our most significant competence gap component back then was will, not knowledge and skill, so additional training on its own would never would have solved that leakage problem. Once we understood that and knew where else to focus in order to create an operating environment conducive to producing better outcomes, we managed the leakage number below 5% within about 12 months.

Many thanks to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who according to my notebook played at least a supporting role in illuminating the true nature and breadth of the root cause problem we were facing!

Dean K. Harring, CPCU, CIC is a retired Chief Claims Officer and an expert and advisor on Property Casualty insurance claims and operations. He can be reached at dean.harring@theclm.org or through LinkedIn or Twitter.